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Abstract. 
IDS Working Paper No. 228 examined the behaviour of the 
lubsidiaries of seven British Multinationals in Kenya with regard to 
heir generation and acquisition of new technology. This Working 
aper is complementary to the earlier one insofar as it examines to 
hat extent the behaviour of the Kenyan subsidiaries is explicable in 
erms of the organisation of the global market in each industry, 
tie global market is thus described, the role of the particular 
Lrm situated and an evaluation made of the extent to which this role 
cplains the behaviour of the Kenyan subsidiaries. Some tentative 
inclusions are offered, but the limitation of sample size is 
iphasized. 
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gineering design) were the: least capital intensive (measuring only 
embodied technology). 
With regard to the orientation of technical change, only two of the 
sample were particularly concerned with cost reduction (tea and tea machin-
ery). The two pharmaceutical subsidiaries were predominantly concerned 
with product technology, and the two capital goods subsidiaries had a 
common interest in product adaptation (particularly with respect to 'technical 
adaptation1). 
None of the sample firms undertook any Basic or Applied research. 
Only two subsidiaries had a significant expenditure (as a percentage of 
value added) on Experimental Development and Adaptation (tea machinery and 
engineering design). Two other subsidiaries (tea production and one of the 
pharmeceutical firms)had some expenditure in these activities, but in both 
cases it amounted, to less than Vjc of value added. One of the important 
conclusions whach emerges from the study is the. importance of quality 
control in stimulating technical change. All of the subsidiaries had some 
sort:-'of quality control and in almost all cases this expenditure exceeded, 
that on formalised Experimental Development and Adaptation. There were 
links between quality: control and; production product - and materials -
technology, although not all Subsidiaries had links in all three spheres-
of technical change.. r ., 
Three of the sample ("cement and the two capital goods firms)had the 
autonomy to choose technology without the participation of the parent. 
By contrast the vehicle assembler and one of the pharmeceutical 
subsidiaries had little autonomy in this respect. Nominal autonomy aside, 
only the two capital goods firms had the ability to make full use of the 
autonomy granted to them by their parents. 
With the exception of the tea producer and the cement subsidiary none » i • • 
of the sample made any specific payments for technology to either the 
parent or non-parent firms. The importance of technology in the relation-
ship of the subsidiaries to the parents is highlighted by the fact that in 
» 
all cases the property rights over technical change were obtained by the 
parents. In all cases the parents were also responsible for the registration 
of patents and brand names in Kenya and eleswhere. 
Given the importance of technology in this parent-subsidiary 
relationship, it is to be expected that each of the firms has a system for 
circulating technical change through the corporate body. The interesting1 
result which emerges .is the ..importance of' man - disembodied technological 
flows through the.firm. 
Technical Change and British Multinationals in Kenya; Some Global 
Considerations. 
Research has been undertaken on the behaviour of the subsidiaries of 
seven British multinationals in Kenya to determine their behaviour with 
regard to the generation and acquisition of new technology} The picture 
which emerged from this study was that in general there was little evidence 
that the subsidiaries generated either product, material or production 
technology themselves, although there was obvious variance between the 
behaviour of different subsidiaries in different sectors. There was also 
little evidence that technical change.resulted from the operations of other 
en.eprises in Kenya or indeed in any other underdeveloped economy. 
It is a basic hypothesis of this study that the global operations of 
the respective multinationals will influence the behaviour of their subsi-
diaries in Kenya (or indeed any other economy). This is not the first 
study which has worked from this premise, but the study does address itself 
to a specific problem in this context which it seems has not yet received 
adequate detailed attention. This concerns the affect of global operations 
on the propensity of subsidiaries to generate their own technology. Some 
limited attention has been given to this problem in research which focusses 
on the tied purchase of equipment, but these studies generally concern 
themselves with the problem of monopolisation rather than that of the 
generation of technology.'-A- further stage of this research (hithertoe 
uncompleted) plans to 'open—up' the problem a little fxp^h^r by examining 
the. behaviour of.the- subsidiaries of the same multinationalsiin. India. 
The presentation of the research will take the follwing form. First 
the Kenyan study will be presented in brief. Then each of the sectors 
(tea production^ pharmeceuticals, cement, vehicle assembly, and refrigerati< 
and air-conditioning engineering and deslgil) ,will be treated individually. 
In each cas£ the structure of the global market for that commodity and the 
competitive position of the firm under investigation will be described. An 
attempt will then be made to show how the global interests of each firm 
influences the" behaviour of the Kenyan subsidiary, particualarly with regarc 
to the generation and acquisition of new technology. 
Summary of Results of Kenyan Study. 
Seven subsidiaries were included in the sample - one tea producer, two 
pharmeoeutical subsidiaries, one cement producer, a vehicle assembler, one 
engineering design subsidiary and one tea machinery producer. The subsidi-
aries varied in the size of their operations, ranging from a turnover of 
£17-65 m to £470,000 per annum. The cement firm was the most capital 
intensive and the two capital goods subsidiaries (tea machinery and . 
7 ' ' 1 :[.• \ 
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at low levels of income, but as per capita income increases beyond, a 
certain level, the consumption of tea tends to remain fairly static. Thus 
in the late nineteenth century the consumption of tea in the developed 
countries (particularly Britain) grew rapidly. But by the time that tea 
production began in earnest in Africa, per capita consumption in Europe 
began to taper off. The response of the larger tea growing firms with 
extensive interests in India and Sri Lanka was to try and form a producers 
cartel (The International Tea Authority). The b^oblem was that at about 
this time production in Africa had .reached exportable quantities. A struggle 
then took place in.Africa. The large international firms who had extensive 
interests in Asia were anxious to limit acerage in Africa to protect their 
own heavy investment in Asia. Mean-while the new small-holders, particu-
larly the vociferous European producers in Kenya who had no interests in 
Asia to protect and who were in a position of perfect competitors ( ie no 
matter how much any one of them produced it would not affect the world 
price of tea), were in favour of expansion of production. 
The end result was that the large companies were able to force a tea 
.. - r (3) • ' , ' • ' 
agreement on the African coloniesv which lasted through a number of renew-
als until 1955. At this stage an important switch of policy occurred in 
the two largest of these international firms. They came to realise that 
the nationalist pressures in Asia would increasingly lead to the erosion 
of their strong position in India and Sri Lanka so that it now became in 
their own interests to encourage increased production in Africa. 
(in order to understand the importance of this change in policy we 
need to know something about the characteristic of a tea-bush. A tea bush 
takes approximately four years from planting until it produces at about 
50f' of its optimal output, and a further four years until it is fully 
mature. It produces at this, level for about 50 years after planting and 
then both yield and quality begin to decline. In addition over the past 
two decades a new more productive variety of tea bush (vegetative production) 
has been developed). 
The policy of the large tea. firms has been to counter the rise of 
t 
economic nationalism in India and Sri Lanka by 'standing still' in these 
countries, maintaining existing plantations where possible and taking part 
in Indian and Sri Lankan tea auctions, and concentrating most of their new 
investment in Africa. Over 5O/0 of tea bushes in India are more than 50 
years old, and unit costs of production in Asia are now some 20-30^ higher 
than those in Africa. In addition the tendency for tea producing firms 
to move into new products has been concentrated in Africa rather than in. 
Asia. 
The international tea industry is dominated by a few large British 
firms, which is explicable in terms of the fact that Britain alone cosumes 
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Finally, with respect to industrial linkages stimulated "by the activities 
of these subsidiaries in Kenya, there is little evidence of .either forward 
or baqfcward linkages. Where linkages have occurred, they have predominantly 
involved other multinational firms. The reason for this relative absence of 
linkages must be found in the undevelopment of the Kenyan industrial sector 
and the weaknes s of the local industrial bourgeoisie, particularly African 
industrialists.. 
I 
Tea 
Tea has been an internationally traded commodity since the last quarter 
of .the nineteenth century, and total annual production is now in the region 
of 1°4 million tons. The overwhelming bulk of this production takes place 
in South Asia, India and Sri Lanka accounting for about TCffi of world output. 
A further 12% is produced in other parts of Asia, and most of the rest is 
produced in Africa. Within Africa about half of total production originates 
in Kenya and Malawi. 
The major .'destabilising factor in the international tea-market over 
the past century has been the emergence of Africa as a significant producer 
for export, and the behaviour of the laijge tea firms cannot be understood 
in isolation from this fact. At the turn of the century almost all tea 
consumed in the developed, countries originated from Asia. But as the 
African hinterland was opened .up by the colonial powers, tea production 
expanded. There were two main factors behind this expansion of production. 
Firstly the colonial powers were anxious to develop export crops in their 
colonies, both to satisfy the demand of their population and as a contri-
butor to imperial budgets and foreign exchange reserves. This led them to 
encourage the production of tea by small-holders in some countries, notably 
Uganda, Tanganyika and Malawi. A second factor encouraging local production 
was the settlement of some colonies by European farmers who were anxious 
to find a new lucrative cash-crop in the face of persistent failure. 
The international tea industry has always been concentrated amongst a 
few large producers based in Britain. Concentration increased over the 
years until the emergence of independence in many colonies began to threaten 
this concentration by encouraging small scale production (especially in 
Africa) and nationalisation (especially in Asia). The increasing concent-
ration of the industry over the years, followed by the recent emergence of 
nationalist pressures in the producing countries helps to explain the 
behaviour of these firms, particularly in regard to their attitude towards 
increased production in Africa. 
In order to understand this behaviour some description of the market 
for tea is necessary. The income elasticity for tea is particularly high 
distribution (many of the Asian estates record nett losses every year), 
this pattern is clearly rational. Thus for example, while its subsidiaries 
only produce about ifo of Sri Lanka's tea, the firm is responsible for 
exporting over one-third of the country's output. 
It is the largest of four firms which dominate the British and European 
market and accounts for over 4 ° f "the British market. This reflects the 
growth of the firm over the years since 20 years ago its share was just over 
2 Of of the British market. It is heavily involved in product differentiation 
and in the UK alone it markets 6 different brands of packet tea and 5 
different brands of tea bags. 
However in spite of its clearly dominant position in the global tea 
market (or perhaps because of this dominance), this ^irm has made a 
policy decision to decrease its dependence on tea. Within the last decade 
it has therefore merged with a large British based meat-packing firm, and 
within the producing countries the firm is embarking on a long run plan 
to move into other agricultural-based intermediate products. Three reasons 
explain this shift of policy. In the first place the world narket is hardly 
growing at all (although this may now change with the new high prices for 
its close substitute, coffee), and while that of underdeveloped countries 
is growing a little faster (particularly in India) it is nevertheless an 
unspectacular overall growth rate. Secondly it is hard to differentiate 
tea as a product -tea is tea is tea - so that the firm is vulnerable to 
competition from others, particularly to a firm with lower overhead costs. 
Some attempt has been made to move into instant tea, (see later) but hopes 
are not high in regard to its future potential, Finally, it is recognised 
that tea production is a relatively simple proceedure and their production 
facilities are increasingly prone to takeover as nationalist pressures 
mount in underdeveloped countries. Hence their move into distuributioft 
amd their quest for alternative products. 
An illustration of the importance of production in Africa to the 
firm is shown by the share of profits and sales contributed by subsidiaries 
in Africa, Asia and the UK and Ireland (table l). It can be clearly seen 
that African subsidiaries produce a disproportionate share of the firms 
profits and that, if anything this share has grown in recent years-. 
e Table 1 
Share of Afr ica, Asia and UK in Group sales and Profits 
S A L E S P R O F I T S 
1970 
"£'000 
U.K AND 
IRELA.NB 
"ST" 7° 
1974 
£'000 
1970 
£'000 
11974 
£'000 T 
112,439 40.2 179,570 39-7 3,531 53-1 2,541 27.1 
ASIA 73,233 26.2 87,526 19-4 1,043 15.7 1,302 13.9 
AFRICA 31,484 11.3 48,711 10.8 1,416 21.3 3,241 34.6 
TOTAL 279,888 100 451,893 100 6,655 100 9,388 100 
Sources Annual Reports 
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about AOfo of world production, underdeveloped countries.take just under 
this figure and the rest.is split amongst other countries, many of•which 
are ex-colonies of Britain. These large.firms are vertically integrated." 
For example, the largest producer (as opposed to marketer) of tea in the 
world has its headquarters in Scotland, controls 10 estates in India and 
Pakistan, 5 in 3ri 'Lanka and 25,000 acres in Kenya. It has subsidiaries 
producing plywood t ea and rubber chests; pulp for the manufacture of paper; 
printing of paper and boxes; produces insecticides and fertilisers; and is 
linked to 20 shipping firms and shipping claims agents in 10 countires and 
8 insurance companies in 5 countries. 
One particularly important characteristic of this vertical integration 
is the participation of these firms as tea purchasers and auctioneers. 
Primary auctions are held in producing countries and transactions take 
place between producers and buyers. These are followed by secondary auct-
ions in London between these buyers, and blenders and retailers. Legisla-
tion in producing countries is designed to ensure that a 'perfect market' 
•is in operation," but since the same firms are involved as sellers and. 
producers in primary markets and in secondary markets, there is clearly 
extensive scope for price manipulation. For example, between 1961 and 
1972 the average annual auction price per kilo of Sri Lankan tea in London 
was between £0.45-50> while the Colombo price was in the region of £0.26 
(ie Rs 4-25-39)? which suggests a considerable uark-up. In addition when 
India increased its export duties on tea in the mid -1960's, and Sri Lanka 
imposed a moratorium on profits, freight and insurance prices increased 
dramatically while local prices were depressed. 
To sum-up, then, the international market is characterised by the 
geographical concentration of production and the concentration of market-
ing and production in a few lange firms based in Britain. Their 
interests/production in Africa have changed dramatically over the years and 
this had had an influence over their policy towards the introduction of new 
technology in Kenya. The tea industry appears to be one where the|"te exists 
abundant opportunity for the manipulation of prices and there is some 
evidence that the firms have taken advantage of this opportunity. 
The Position of the Sample Firm in the Global Market. 
• The firm in this study is the dominant marketer..,.of... t.e_a...in. the. .world , 
i 
and is directly involved in the (iistri.but.ip_n ..of abput ..a ..qxurt.ec ~pf. !the 
world's tea. crop and indirectly rcontrols"the distribution' of a further 
15^. Its tea interests are widspread, with estates in. all the. major pro-'.; 
ducin^: countries,. . In.-addit-ion-iit-is- an- agent- for 29 independent estates • 1 
..in'Sri: Lanka, most of. -t;he_.independent -producers in; Kenya and over 5.0 -large-
\estates... in India,. . Since, as.-we :have.-seen, the real profits arise- in- - .. 
The Effect of Global Operations on Generation and Acquisition of 
; Technology by the Kenyan Subsidiary. 
We have seen that the global operations of this firm suggest that three 
dominant factors will affect the behaviour of the Kenyan subsidiary. These 
are that (i) Kenya is particularly important producing country for the firm 
and that- much of the firm's new investment over the years will have been 
concentrated1 in Kenya. (ii) the operation of the Kenyan subsidiary ref-
lects the Group's desire to lessen its dependence on tea, and (iii) the 
Kenyan subsidiary reflects the general move from production into 
distribution. :Each of these factors influence the behaviour of the Kenyan 
subsidiary in the generation and acquisition of new. technology. 
Before the effect which these global factors have (on the situation of 
technical change in the firm)Is described, it is necessary to make 
explicit the expectation that it is in the nature of agricultural based 
industries that much of their research and development is tied of nece-
ssity to the producing country. It is partly a geographical accident 
that tea production overwhelmingly takes place in underdeveloped countries 
and it is thus likely that at least some R & D is done at source. This is 
in fact largely confirmed by the study - almost all of the new technology 
used in the growing of tea originates in producing countries, such as 
optimal fertiliser patterns, new techniques .of growing, the use of shade-
trees etc. On the other hand the position changes in relation to proce-
ssing equipment, and the more complex the technology involved, the greater 
the tendency to situate the R & D in a developed countries. This is partly 
because of the back-up services required,, partly a consequence of the 
disposition'of research workers, and partly one of the more important ways 
the parent ensuros that it maintains control over the new teohnology. 
This pattern is clearly reflected in the behaviour of this firm. 
Simple processing equipment is fabricated (ie from imported motors, steel 
etc) in Kenya (by another firm in the Kenyan study) and some is 
manufactured in India and Sri .Lanka. But the most import an development 
in processing technology in recent years - the development of instant tea 
was entirely situated in Britain in the developmental stages. Once the 
technology had been developed, a plant was set-up in Kenya, but even then 
the tcialruns and commissioning were the responsibility of the parent 
corporation. The participation of the Kenyan subsidiary has been limited 
to the operation of. the plant once it has been commissioned. 
The development of this instaht tea- technology raises another impor-
tant point about the behaviour of this firm. Their R & D unit^-wasset-up 
in direct response to the challenge of producing an acceptable instant tea 
technology. Now that the challenge has been met the firm has disbanded 
its R & D unit'. This is seen by the' firm as the abandonment of R & D and 
as marking a significant change in corporate policy. Th.it this is the 
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case is not entirely clear for the formal abandonment of R & D was 
associated with the complete reoganisation' of its Technical Services Unit. 
One of the functions of.this new unit has been to solve problems which 
arise in various subsidiaries and it has absorbed much of the former R & D 
•staff. Rather than an abandonment of R & D, it seems to mark a turning 
point in that there is little further scope for' large technical breakthroughs 
of the sort which require concentrated R & D inputs and attention has now 
to he given to smaller, more incremental change. 
Aside from this new, more complex instant tea technology, most of the 
technical change which does take place occurrs in underdeveloped countries. 
As we have seen the firm's global interests dictate that future expansion 
should take place in Africa rather than in Asia. Therefore much of the new 
production technology which has been developed has taken place in Kenya, 
even if the technology itself has been generated in <!sia. For example, the 
firm has concentrated the planting of high yielding vegetative production 
tea bushes in Kenya. In the sphere of materials technology, much of the 
technical change in the firm has occurred originally in Kenya - the deve-
lopment of new insecticides were pioneered in conjunction with multinational 
agro-chemical subsidiaries in Kenya and then transferred•to Asia. 
But it is in the sphere of product technology that most of the new 
technology has been introduced. As we have seen long-run corporate policy 
has been to move out of reliance on tea to new, agricultural-based inter-
mediate products. The Kenyan subsidiary has pioneered the development of 
the cinchona tre-e (processed in Europe to manufacture quinine to send back 
to Kenya.as a malaria palliative!) as well as that of tara bark (used in 
the manufacture of tannin). Both have required some developmental work 
(e.g. the use of a computer to design optimal cultivating patterns). 
Another sign of the importance of Africa (and Kenya in particular) for this 
firm was the decision to situate the new instant tea plant in Kenya, rather 
than in another country. 
Two cautionary points need to be made in conclusion. The first is that 
in spite of the rather specific nature of this industry leading to the 
situation of some R & D in an underdeveloped' economy, care should be taken 
not to overstimate the significance of this phenomenom. The total annual 
expenditure on all forms of R & D by this firm was about £35,000, (0.92% 
of value added and 0.002% of turnover) and the R & D which has taken place 
has been of an insignificant nature. Where technical change has been more 
complex in nature, it has been developed in Britain and parent has made 
sure it has maintained exclusive control over the technology. The second point 
is that the importance of the Kenyan subsidiary to the firm should 
not lead to the conclusion that no technical change at all takes place in 
Asia. Here an important point emerges. The Indian subsidiary has been 
restricted in the repatriation of dividends and as a consequence the Indian 
subsidiary has been characterised by a large degree of liquidity. This 
money has been used in part to fund the generation of new technology. To 
a limited extent it has l'ed to the innovation of new production technology 
in that high yielding varieties have been planted in marginal lands (as the 
parent thought it politically unwise to hold unutilised land) and new 
tea-picking techniques have been developed and transmitted to other sub-
sidiaries. It has also led to some detailed research on product technology, 
and the Indian subsidiary has undertaken some original investigation into 
the properties of oleo-resins (which comprise the flavouring agents of 
certain spices). The stage has not been reached yet where this product 
technology can be implemented, but when it does it will be of interest to 
see in which subsidiary the innovation takes place. 
II 
PHARMECEUTICAL3 
So much has been written on the global pharmeceutical industry that 
there is some ndanger of stating what has become the obvious. Never-
theless it is perhaps the best example of an industry which cannot be 
understood outside of the global context. It exhibits most of the 
characteristics of truly multinational enteprise. For exambple its size, 
estimated to be over £10,600m by the mid 1980's (compared to the value of 
ourrent production of just over £100m for the tea industry - at London 
auction prices). It is characterised by multinational production 
facilities - 3o/o of HoffmanLa Roche's production (the world's largest 
producer) takes place in foreign.suosidiaries. And perhaps, most strikingly 
the industry seems to be characterised by higher levels of transfer pricing 
than any other industry. 
The most important characteristic of the industry is the phenomenon of 
product differentiation allied to large inputs of R & D. There are roughly 
500 listed illnesses on the WHO register, and about 150 of these occurr 
quite frequently. Although this would appear to allow for a large number 
of formulations, this hardly in itself explains the number of drugs 
annualy introduced into an existing total of over 500,000- the US Food and 
Drugs Administration alone estimates that it annually receives applications 
for the approval of over 3,400 new forumulationz. The generation of these 
product formulations is dependent upon large inputs of R & D and generally 
takes the following form. Thousands of drug combinations are screened in an 
attempt to descover a hitherto unknown formulation which has some beneficial 
affect on the body without harmful side-affects. Most of these combinations 
are variants on existing foundations, and as the years go by without a 
major new breakthrough (as in the case of antibiotics)the screening process 
becomes less productive, and hence more costly. For example, one of the 
pharmeceutical firms in this study holds the patent on an effective anti-
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rheumatic drug. But in order to 'discover' it, it first screened 13,620 
other therapeutic compounds. 
Another prominent feature of the pharmeceutical industry are the 
elements of monopoly which exist. There are nurnerou^ f irms in this sector, 
and one estimate is that no single firm controls more than 7% of total 
productiorl. But this overall picture of diversity masics extensive pocicets 
of monopoly, with most large firms holding monopoly, positions in the 
production of a specific drug family (for example the firm in this study 
has a monopoly on the anti-rheumatic drug which alone accounts for 60^'r of 
its ethical drug sales). 
R i D in this industry.is therefore an important element in each 
firm's quest for areas of monopoly. However, given the relatively limited 
number of illnesses in relation to the total number of drugs, much of this 
R & T) goes into development of existing breakthroughs rather than into 
basic research. One estimate is that about 85% of all R & D in the industry 
• 5 goes into development and only 15% into research. 
..T.he multinational characteristics of the industry are reflected in 
the performance of R & D. Unlike some industries where R & D is confined 
to the country of the parent, most of the larger rnultinati-onal pharmeceut-
ical firms perform R Sc D in a number of countries. To what extent this 
includes underdeveloped economies (in spite of the cheapness of their 
research staff in relation to that of developed countries), is doubtful, 
although there is some evidence of R & D being und-ertaken in India and 
Latin America. 
One final relevant characteristic of the industry is that some of 
the larger firms are beginning to diversify their activities, in spite of 
the fact that profit rates in the pharmeceutical industry are relatively 
high. Partly this is because these large profits, coupled with extensive 
transfer pricing and increasing resistance to the practice of molecular 
manipulation have made governments increasingly prone to regulate their 
activities (as with the recent action of the British government towards 
Hoffman La Roche). It is also partly a reflection of the fact that there 
is some evidence that some new breakthroughs in the industry are likely to 
weaken their competitive position (for example the suggestion that new drug 
delivery systems which are are capable of delivering drugs to particular 
areas of the body are likely to lead to a drop in the overall consumption 
of drugs). The response of the pharmeceutical firms has been to move into 
allied fields, such as cosmetics, medical equipment etc. 
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The position of the underdeveloped countries in the global market is 
characteristically weak. With over 7$>°f the world's population (and 
presumably a disproportionate share of its illnesses) the underdeveloped 
countries account for only about 14 of world consumption of pharmeceuticals. 
The monopolistic position held by the multinational pharmeceutical firms is 
intensified in these countries - for example it is estimated that in 1969 
multinational subsidiaries controlled nearly 8O/0 of the Brazilian market, 
65t of the Argentinian market, 65c/° of the Indian market and nearly 100/fc 
of the Kenyan market. The structure of product differentiation and the 
emphasis on marketing ire replicated in these countries. 
The Position of the Sample Firms in the Global Market. 
Two pharmeceutical subsidiaries were included in the Kenyan study, 
referred to here as B and C. In terms of total turnover C is bigger than 
B (£414m in 1974 compared to £'259m). Yet in terms of production of 
pharmeceuticals, B is bigger and was estimated to be the l8th largest 
producer of pharmeceuticals in the world in 1971 and the largest single 
British producer. In 1972 C was reckoned to be the 57"th largest firm in 
the UK (measured by capital employed), while B was estimated to be the 
66th largest (l97l)« By global standards in the industry, then, these are 
relatively small companies and this is true even in terms of aggregate 
size in relation to all British companies. But they do figure very 
prominently amongst British based pharmeceutical firms. A short- history of 
each of these firms will help to set them in context. 
B began in 1904 as a producer of baby foods. It grew steadily over 
the. years until the 1950's. At this stage a hectic 15 years programme of 
merger and acquisition of competitors took place (in line with the general 
trend . in Bitish industry at this time) until B established itself as 
the dominant firm in the UK industry. It penetrated international markets 
sooner than its British competitors and now has an established range of 
overseas operations.. There are 48 worldwide subsidiaries of which 15 are 
in the UK, 14 in other developed countries and 19 in underdeveloped count-
ries. Forty three of these are wholly•owned subsidiaries and at least 
75^ of equity is held in the other five. It is predominantly a producer 
of pharmeceuticals 90^ of its profits come from ethical pharmeceuticals. 
B is Europe's largest producer of bulk fermentation products and it is 
amongst the World's largest producers of anti-biotics and corticosteroids. 
Overseas sales comprised over 60fo of total turnover in 1974* 
C has a competely different background. The firm originally began as 
a chain of chemists which expanded rapidly over the years. Despite attempts 
to diversify into pharmeceutical production and international operations, 
it is still predominantly a UK-based retail marketing group. It operates 
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about 1,400 chemist shops in the UK and over '80fo of sales are made-up of 
non-pharmeceutical products. There are 21 worldwide usbsidiaries", 10 of 
which are in the UK, 6 in tbther developed countries and 5 in underdeveloped 
countries. All but 5'°f these are whoxly-owned. C has moved into inter-
national operations much more recently than B, and despite rapid growth of 
international operations they still comprised only about 5% of total sales 
(although, reportedly of'a much higher share of profits) in 1974. The move 
into pharmeceutical production has 'also been'a recent phenomenon and has 
been founded on the success of the anti-rheumatic drug mentioned earlier. 
Since only five years remain before the patent on this drug expires, much 
depends on the current programme of R & 10 if C is to remain as a successful 
pharmeceutical firm. It should be noted that- the operations of the Kenyan 
subsidiary are distinctly different from those of the- parent, since there 
is- no retailing outlet in-Kenya and much of the subsidiary's output is 
made-up of non-prescription pharmeceutical products. 
In the early 1970's C made an atempt to take-over B. It' was a rather 
complicated picture which was characterised by 3'0'me observers as an attempt 
by C to get into the 'big-time' as a pharmeceutical producer. The outcome 
was that the UK Monopolies Commission vetoed 'the take-over largely i»n the 
grounds that-' it would have had a deleterious" affect' on 'the performance 
of R & D. The effect on international" operations would perhaps have been 
less deleterious as B was strong in markets where G was weak and vice versa. 
The distribution of global sales for the two firms is shown in table 
2 and table 3 
Table 2 
B; lobal Sales in 1974 
£ in % 
UK 100.7 38.9 
Europe 67.9 - 26.3 
Asia 40.8 15.8 
The America • 22.1 8.6 
Africa 15.6 6.0 
Australia 11.5 4.4 , . 
• Total 258.6 100 
Sources Annual Reports. • 
: Table' 3 '. 9 
C? Global. Sales 'in 1974 -
£ m • 
' * 
Africa-, and New'East' 6 . 1.5 
Australia 5.5 1.3 
Asia - 6.8-.': 1.6 
America:. 1.6 0.4 
Europe ( UK') 394.1 95-2 
Total 414 100 
Source; Annual Reports 
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The Effect of Global Operations on the Generation and. Acquisition of 
Technology by the Kenyan Subsidiaries. 
The Kenyan subsidiaries of these two firms are small by comparison 
with other overseas subsidiaries. B is a 'tariff jumper' in the sense 
that local production both anticipated and followed the introduction of 
tariffs after independence as a way of consolidating its market position in 
Kenya which had been developed prior to independence. Tfye presence of C 
in Kenya reflects the decision by the parent in 'the late " bU* s to ^ 
increase international operations. Rather than establish a new subsidiary 
the .firm chose to take over the only existing locally-owned pharmeceutical 
enteprise in Kenya which, conveniently, produced much the same range of 
products as C viz some pharmeceuticals and some cosmeUcs. In addition 
baby products have now been added to the subsidiary's portfolio of products. 
The behaviour, of these two subsidiaries clearly reflects the global 
organisation of the market. Since there are reputed to be significant 
economies of scale in the production of pharmeceuticals, the Kenyan 
subsidiaries make no attempt whatsoever to produce these locally. Their 
local production is confined almost entirely (with the one exception of 
B's production of baby foods) to mixing, pill-making and packaging. 
These activities are not characterised by significant scale-economies, 
and anyway they make up only a small proportion of value added in the 
final product. The production technology used by these firms is therefore 
rather simple and a range of. equipment (producing at varying rates of 
output) is readily available on the world market. 
Small as these needs may be with regard to production technology, 
there is an identifiable difference in the policy of these two 
subsidiaries in the generation and acquisition of new technology. B 
procures all its production technology from Europe - although it is 
consulted by the Technical Services Division of the parent, the ultimate 
choice and purchase is undertaken by the parent. C appears to have much 
more autonomy in the acquisition of production technology and this is 
reflected in the fact that since the take-over in 1970, approximately 20?t> bf 
its production technology has been locally manufactured. To some extent 
the subsidiary has itself been involved in the generation of hew tequniques 
in consultation with local suppliers. Care should be taken however not to 
overestimate the significance of these local purchases, since the production 
technology has been relatively simple (eg tin-fillers), and local 
production has largely.consisted of making up a suitable machine from 
imported components, albeit to a local design. 
Changes in material technology have predominantly been embodied 
in imported inputs and the two subsidiaries have had little envolvement 
in these changes. The one exception to this concerns packaging materials 
and here, too, C has been more active in the generation of locally 
designed and produced '.inputs. It has made a decision to purchase all of 
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its packaging inputs from local producers in order 'to. 9,0 inventories and.;i' 
reduce lead-times' between .order. And. delivery..• ; -In-.consultation with local' 
producers (notably the subsidiary of a Canadian/British multinational) 
changes have been made in the nature of packaging materials produced. The" ' 
interesting point here is that.it is frequently argued that-subsidiaries4 
of product differentiating multinationals replicate parent product-choices 
entirely so that, for example, a Coca Cola is a Coca Cola wherever one 
goes. In the case of C this policy, particularly in regard to packaging 
used in product differentiating strategies, has to some extent been ... 
forsaken in the interest "of using local inputs. This as we can see, does 
have a limited affect on the generation of new material technology. 
We have observed earlier that product technology is the most important 
sphere of technical change for the pharmeceutical industry. This pattern 
is clearly evident, in the behaviour of these two subsidiaries. New products 
have been 
innovated,, product—differentiation techniques are used and 
existing products are adapted. Both product innovation and differentiation 
follow the pattern of the parents and little new product technology is 
required by either of these two subsidiaries in this regard. But for both 
'technology is required by either of these two subsidiaries in this regard. 
But for both 'technical' (eg climatic) and other reasons, existing products 
do have to be adapted to suit local conditions. Here too, a difference 
occ'urrs in the behaviour of the two subsidiaries. B relies completely on 
the parent for reformulation - a consultant is sent out by the parent to 
make the necessary changes, and the new product is then tested by the 
parent to see if the quality is acceptable. C has much more autonomy. It 
undertakes the reformulation itself and..then sends the new product to the 
parent to see whether it .satisfies the requirements of quality. ' 
Thus the two subsidiaries do differ significantly in .the degree of 
autonomy which they have from their respective parents. This clearly ' 
affects their behaviour with regard to the generations and acquisition of 
technology. C is involved in the local generation of 
materials, product 
and production technology, and B appears not to be. With regard to the 
acquisition of new technology, C also appears to have more autonomy to 
unbundle and diversify its purchases from that of the parent. 
The question of .'interest to us is to what extent the differential 
behaviour of these two subsidiaries is explicable in terms of the role 
which their parents play in the global pharmeceutical industry. It is 
believed that there are three explanatory factors here. The first is that 
B is primarily a pharmeceutical manufacturer and has extensive investment 
in the production of some inputs. It also has presumably over the years 
developed relationships with machinery producers which it can manipulate 
to its own advantage in the purchase of machinery. By contrast C has 
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predominantly been a marketing enteprise with few production facilities of 
its own and little oppo tunity to develop these close relationships with 
machinery suppliers. There is therefore much more advantage to be gained 
for B if it is able to route the purchases by its subsidiary through its 
own centralised production and marketing operations. 
The second explanatory factor concerns the experience which each of 
the firms has had in the sphere of international operations. B, as we 
have seen, is a long established international operator3 while G ia a 
relative newcomer. Now there are clearly benefits to be gained (up to a 
certain point, anyway) in firm strategies which emphasize global maximisa-
tion, rather than local profit centres. The problem for the new entrant, 
however, is that these benefits follow years of experience in the manipu-
lation of subsidiaries to satisfy global interests. C, being a relative 
newcomer, is at a distinct disadvantage in this sphere and this is 
reflected in the relative autonomy which it accords to its subsidiary. 
There is a third explanatory factor which is offered in contradiction 
of the second factor discussed above. It may be that there are advantages 
to be gained by the firm if subsidiaries are allowed to adapt to the local 
environment, as in the case of C whose locally generated production 
technology reflects local factor proportions more accurately than imported 
tequniques, and where inventory costs are lowered by the purchase of 
locally generated materials technology. The explanation may be that it is 
the nature of organisational behaviour that the newer, and more eager, an 
entrant may be to global operations or a local market, the more flexibility 
it exhibits in regard to adapting to local conditions. 
Given that to some extent the explanatory reasons offered above are 
contradictory (i.e. in the losts and benefits of subsidiary autonomy), it 
is not clear where the answer lies. There is seldom any virtue in 
compromise, but in this particular case it does appear that all of these 
factors explain various aspects of the behaviour of these two subsidiaries. 
Generation of technology locally is both an advantage and a disadvantage 
to C. The real question arises with regard to the direction of future 
policy by the firm. Given the costs and benefits of autonomy, will future 
decisions be reflected in increased, or less autonomy by this subsidiary? 
Ill 
Cement 
Cement has been produced on a commercial scale since the beginning of 
the twentieth century and is now a universal building material. Because 
of the ubiquity of raw materials used to manufature cement, it ' is now 
produced in almost every country. There is still significant global trade 
in the commodity (about 30m tons a year), but most countries are developing 
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their industries "to attain self-sufficiency. 
Between the two world wars, European and American producers operated 
cartels•which determined•export shares. However after- the second world 
war the trend for most countries was to establish their own cement plants were 
and these cartels/ undermined. The ma jority of cement plants in the world 
are now wholly-owned by national capital, and where this in not the case, 
the trend is towards .excluding foreign equity in these enteprises, 
particularly in underdeveloped countries. ,,. : ,. ,• •, 
•--There are, as a consequence, few multinational operating in this' 
sector. The largest producer is probably a French firm, which is followed 
in size by the British firm (involved in this study) and then a Swiss ' 
Firm . At a smaller scale (in terms of total output, home and abroad) 
are three American multinationals. 
To som® extent the pattern of enforced divesting is explained by the 
lack of vertical integration in the industry. With few minor exceptions, 
production of cement is entirely divorced from the manufacture of cement 
plant. Ten firms dominate the production of cement plant and two of these 
- one German and one Danish .firm-account for about half of the world's out-
put. For many years the technology for cement production has been relati-
vely stable. Basically there are two different methods of manufacturing 
the commodity, the wet process and the dry process. The wet process is 
most applicable to raw materials with a naturally high water content. 
It is technically the simplest method and involves grinding the raw 
materials with water and' feeding it into the kiln after which it emerges 
as clinker. In the case of the dry process, the raw materials are ground 
without water. This latter process utilises exhaust gases to dry the raw 
materials in the girinding process and thus leads to a marked reduction 
in unit energy costs. This has become an.obvious asset in recent years. 
Although these technologies have been relatively stable over the 
•years, as have the market shares of machinery suppliers, the picture has 
begun to change recently for a number of reasons. Firstly the change in 
6 energy prices has affected the relative costs of the wet and dry processes. 
Secondly a number of these suppliers, notably the smaller' Japanese firms, 
made 
have recently/a series of breakthroughs in terms of kiln size, heat and 
pollution saving innovations and automation and quality control. The 
result has been that in both periods - initially the relatively stable 
earlier stage, and then in the changing recent period - the market has 
been characterised by a relatively competitive oligopoly. 
In the face of this divorce of cement production from machinery 
production and the relatively competitive market for machinery manufacture, 
the cement producers have been able to develop a role for themselves as 
consultants and management - contractors.5brth& existence of this oligopoly 
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in machinery manufacture hj-s me&nt that the price of particular pieces of 
equipment results from a bargai ning process. The capital cost of plant, 
measured in terms of dollars per ton of annual capacity, has been known 
to vary between $50 and 5200. To the extent that the larger producers 
have knowledge and experience of purchase of cement plant they are able 
to 'sell themselves' to new producers in terms of obtaining the lowest 
quotations for machinery. 
There are other features which encourage the growth of consultancy 
services. The production of cement is relatively capital intensive and 
for some underleveloped countries, particularly those in Africa, it is a 
relatively complex process. The costs of inefficient utilisation can 
therefore be high and this has been an important factor in pursuading a 
number of underdeveloped countries, notably in Africa, South America and 
recently in Iran and the Middle East, to accept management contracts and 
hire consultant firms. One additional factor is that quality control is 
an important element in the manufacture of cement and many firms (such as 
the subsidiary in this study) do not have the capacity to undertake all 
of these tests themselves. They therefore need to link themselves to 
larger producers in order to undertake adequate quality control testing. 
In recent years there has been a renewed emergence of marketing 
cartels amongst the larger producing firms. 
For example, the British firm in "this sample has formed a joint 
company with the S/riss multinational mentioned above to serve the countries 
in the Arabian Gulf from their jointly owned plant in Kenya. Clinker is 
produced in the plant on the Kenyan coast and this is bulk-transhipped 
to countries in the Gulf for.girinding into the final product. 
The Position of the Sample Firm in the Global Market. 
The firm in this study produced a total- Of 27-5m tons of cement in 
1973, making it the second biggest cement producer in the world. The share 
of overseas deliveries (i.e. UK exports and production by overseas subsid-
aries) has grown markedly over the years and now comprises over 5O/0 of 
tatal deliveries. There are twelve principal subsidiaries (i.e. where it 
holds more than 50fi> of equity), of which nine are in developed countries. 
In addition there are another fourteen associate companies (i.e. where it 
holds more than 2CP/> and less than ^CF/l of equity), of which seven are in 
developed countries. Finally there are two further companies (one in 
Kenya and one in Spain) in which less than 20fo of equity is held. 
There are three factors which broadly explain the behaviour of this 
firm in the global market. The first concerns the problems it faces in 
the home market. The growth of the British economy has fluctuated notably 
over the past three decades, and the construction sector has felt these 
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fluctuations particularly severeley. This unstable market has also shown 
little tendency to grow. Production by this firm for the home market has in 
fact remained fairly static and between 1965 and 1971 there was hardly any 
sign' of growth at all. In addition the Brit-ish Government reacted to 
serve inflation in recent years by introducing price controls on ordinary 
Portland cement. 
The reaction of the firm to these problems in the home market has 
been twofold. Firstly it has countered price controls on ordinary portland 
cement by leading in the field of product innovation. A number of new type 
of cement'which have specific uses (such as'the newly developed glass-
reinforced concrete) and which are exempt from price control in the UK, 
have been developed. Secondlywit has attempted to increase its penetration 
of foreign markets and the share of foreign deliveries has increased 
markedly from 2.5$ in 1945 to 22.8% in 1960 to 53$ in 1973- Sales to these 
markets have predictably been more profitable and this is shown in table 4» 
Table 4 
Share of Home and Foreign Sales and Profits in Group Performance 
% share of turnover fc share of profit 
1973 1974 1973 1974' 
U K 72.I 71.7 65-4 43-4 
Total over-
auase 28 28.3 34.6 56.6 
African 14.6 25.4 21.3 51.1 
Australasian 13.0 2.5 13 3.3 
Sources Company Report 1974* Difference between 19,73 and 1974 for 
Australasia is largely a result of loss of majority equity in 
one Australasian firm. 
The second factor which'has influenced the global behaviour of this 
firm has been the tendency to enforced divestment in foreign (particularly 
underdeveloped) countries. According the company has "had to modify and 
adjust its policy towards overseas investment seeking to maintain a 
strong 'influence on those companies in which it had invested in the past 
( 7 ) 
and seeking-to maximise control over new investment". The consultancy 
division was set up in 1969 to market the group's technological knowhow 
in this context. "The Consultancy Service works closely with the Over-
sease contacts, and feeding them back information on potential opportuni-
ties for investment". The firm maintains that since the group "does not 
manufacture plant or machinery for.the.cement industry, it therefore has 
no vested interest in the selection of plant. It offers a complete range 
of services, from preliminary economic financial and geological investi-
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gations through to planning and designing new plant, commissioning and 
erection and full management and technical assistance including 
negotiations with machinery suppliers and sources of finance, and selection 
and training of staff". 
In 1974. the firm announced its biggest consultancy contract so far, 
worth £1.5m with a joint Moroccan/Algerian government plant. It will be 
responsible for the design, engineering and supervision of construction 
together with the training of manpower to run the plant on completion. It 
is also active in South America, Quatar, Zambia, Iran and Kenya. A new 
consultancy partnership has been established with the Swiss firm to serve 
the Middle East exclusively and it is negotiating with its Mexican partner 
to set up a consultancy unit to serve Central and South America and the 
Caribbean. 
The third factor which has affected its global operations has been 
its link with the Swiss firm to serve the Arabian Gulf export market from 
the Kenyan subsidiary. Since this intimately affects our discussion on 
the behaviour of the Kenyan subsidiary in question we shall turn to this 
later. 
The Effect of Global Operations on the Generation and Acquisition 
of - Technology by the Kenyan Subsidiary 
There are two cement producing firms in Kenya. One is centred in the 
interior of the country near the capital city, Nairobi, and is the oldest 
plant, with an annual capacity of 250,000 tons. It was set-up initially 
by local-capital to grind imported clinker in the 1930's and was t^ken-over 
in the 1950's by two British firms - one of which was the firm in this 
study. In the latter 1960's, its British partner sold its share to the 
Swiss multinational,but this change was associtaed with enforced partici-
pation by the Kenyan Government - who now own.over -50% of thw equity 
capital (the two multinational now only hold 14% each of the equity.). 
The plant produces for the local market only and, officialy, not for 
export. (in fact some of the output is'reported to be smuggled into 
Uganda). The British firm holds a Technical Services Agreement with this 
.subsidiary and as part of this agreement, it provides technical manpower, 
assists in the process of quality control by analysis of samples in the 
parent company, assists in the purchase of machinery and is available for 
consultation should any problems arise. The Swids partener is 'not 
active' and merely holds equity. 
The second plant in Kenya is situated on the coast and produces 
predominantly for export. Of its 1.25m tons annual production, 250,000 
tons will go to the local market and the rest is for expnrt to the Arabian 
Gulf in the form of clinker. Eaoh of- the multinational partners (i.e. the 
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firm in the study and its Swiss partner) holds 40a- of the equity and in 
this case the Swiss firm holds the management contract for the firm 
the terms of which are unforutunately not known. 
The research was concentrated on the generation and acquisition of 
technology in the Nairobi subsidiary since the focus was on the British 
multinational and it was active, through the Technical Services Agreement, 
in this plant. However clearly the behaviour of the one subsidiary cannot 
be considreed in isolation, particularly as there is obviously a closely 
harmonised strategy in the behaviour of these two firms. 
The strategy is concentrated on the behaviour of the exporting 
subsidiiry. Partly this is because of the need to control the export 
market to the Arabian Gulf and partly (it is suspected, although no 
evidence is as yet available) because this export market offers plentiful 
opportunity for transfer pricing. The main funtion of the holding in the 
Nairobi plant is therefore firstly, as a source of funding for the 
Consultancy Unit and secondly, as a way of controlling a potentially 
disruptive factor with regard to the lucrative export market to the Gulf. 
As a consequence the expansion of capacity has been confined to the export 
plant which is currently expanding- capacity from 0.75® tons to 1.25m tons. 
The Nairobi plant has seen no expansion of capacity since the existing 
plant was established in the late 1950's. There are also no plans to 
expand output in this plant, in spite of the shortage of cement on the home 
'The contribution of the parent in the sphere of production technology 
is thus limited since there is little prospect of new capacity oeing 
added to the plant. It'provides disembodied managerial and technical . 
inputs as specified by the Technical Services Agreement, and is heavily 
involved in the quality control procedure in analysing some intermediates 
in Britain. The main contribution in new production technology is with 
regard to the savings of energy costs since the increase in prices in 
1973. The plant is of the wet-process type which means that it is a 
particulary important problem for the firm due to high unit energy costs. 
Since the parent currently operates a number of similar plants in other 
parts of the world, the Kenyan subsidiary is awaiting the results of 
research into this problem which will ofe passed on to the Kenyan 
subsidiary when available. No information exists as to whether this will 
be provided in terms of the existing agreement or as part of a new • pa'ckage 
There is some evidence that the link to the British parent has had 
negative affects on the introduction' of new production technology. In the 
1950's, the Nairobi plant was grinding imported clinker and wished to 
introduce a kiln to manuficture clinker itself. The British parent is 
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reputed to have used its cross-holding of equity to "block the introduction. 
(q) of this kiln for a number of years. 
As we have seen product technology has become of considerable 
importance in the cement industry, with a number of special types of 
cement and available. The Nairobi plant produces only ordinary portland 
cement and the production of specialised derivatives (such as cement used 
in the lining of oil bore-holes) has been confined to the export plant. 
Materials technology is of no great importance in this industry and there 
is thus little participation by the parent in this regard. 
In summary, control by the parent in this subsidiary is predominantly 
exercised through the management contract, rather than through, the (small) 
equity holding. The importance of this control is manifested with regard 
to the performance of the-second, export-oriented subsidiary at the coast. 
A second less-important aspect of the participation in the Nairobi plant, 
is that it provides the opportunity for participation by the Consultancy 
Service Division in the face of forced divestment. Both aspects are 
clearly explicable in terms ~of the global operations of the firm. 
IV 
Vehicle Assembly. 
The development of the motor industry over the past seventy five 
years is a familiar story which needs no detailed repetition. The 
(10) 
industry is now of signficant size in many developed economies and of 
growing importance in many underdeveloped economies. 
• Technical change has been of considerable importance in the growth 
of the industry. In .the sphere of production technology, the main changes 
have concerned the scale economies which result from.the utilisation of 
. mass production techniques. This has lead to the increased division of 
labour in the plant and increased mechanisation. 
Changes in production technology have also occurred in the industry, 
as all product ranges are heavily differentiated in a. product conscious 
market. For the consumer, price and product variation are indissoluble, 
so much so that in a marketing sense, each particular vehicle may sell to 
a restricted market. The share of this market is however very sensitive 
to both changes in unit cost and in product characteristics, so consider-
able resources go into changes in product technology. 
Changes in material technology have also been of importance to the 
industry. But unlike production and product technology, these changes in 
by material technology have predominantly been carried through/component 
suppliers to the vehicle manufacturing companies. This has important 
implications for the vehicle industry and there is some evidence that 
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vehicle manufacturers who do not buy-in large quantities of components 
tend to lag in the product technology which results from the utilisation 
of these components'^ 
The first half of the century jaw the domination of car production 
internationally by the American firms. In post war years, however, 
European and Japanese firms have shown striking growth in the output of 
motor vehicles in a period which has seen the increased interpenetration 
of markets by producers. Not only has this led to the rapid growth of 
exports, but increasingly to the practice of manufacturing abroad. To 
what extent this pattern of location of production is durable is unclear. 
There have been signs recently that (in the mould of the product cycle) 
some component:producers are locating themselves in low-wage economies, 
and also that low-wage economies (and Eastern Europe) are themselves 
(12 ) 
building the capability for the mass-production of motor vehicles. 
Yet at present underdeveloped countries are insignificant.both in terms 
of' the scale of production and the scale of the market for motor 
vehicles. 
The production of commercial vehicles (which together with four-
wheel drive vehicles are the subject of this study) has followed a 
slightly different pattern. Until very recent years commercial vehicle 
markets in developed countries have been dominated by national producers. 
But change is imminent with a number of American firms building plants 
in Europe and intra-European cross penetration of markets increasing. 
Another difference between the car and commercial vehicle production has 
been the relative absence of large scale production in this sector, 
particularly with regard to the heavier vehicles. 
The market for four-wheel drive vehicles has features of both car 
and commercial vehicle markets. Like the latter, the scale of production 
is relatively small, but since these smaller vehicles use many components 
developed for motor cars, scale economies do arise in the production of 
some inputs (e.g. engines). Unlike either the car of commercial vehicle 
markets, there are relatively few producers on the market - the American 
firms produce largely for the domestic market, while the sole Japanese 
and British firms produce primarily for the export market. 
The Position of the Sample Firm in the Global Market. 
The firm in question is the only British owned car manufacturing 
firm. There are fourty-eight worldwide subsidiaries, twenty two of which 
are in Britain and eight in underdeveloped countries. All but three of 
the underdeveloped country subsidiaries are wholly owned. The distribution 
of global sales is shown in table 5. The firm has recently been taken-
over by the British government and has been the subject of much discussion 
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as to its future viability which is in question given the existing orga-
nisation of sccattered small scale plants. 
Tabel 5 
Global Sales in 1975 
£ m $ 
UK 343 52.9 
North America 133 3.3 
Europe 275 17.2 
Africa 117 7-3 
Australasia 107 6.7 
India and Pakistan 40 2.5 
S and C America 39 2.5 
Par East 21 1.3 
Other 20 1.3 
Total 1595 100 
Introduction of commercial vehicles is less concentrated than that 
of cars and there exist a number of small producers in operation in 
Britain. Presumably this reflects the fact that scale economies are less 
important and that the use of bought-in components is more widespread 
in the production of commercial vehicles. 
Unlike its European and American counterparts this British firm does 
not dominate its own, or any other large market. Its share of the home 
market for commercial vehicles has fallen from 4lf< in 1966 to about 30fc 
in 1974 ~ unit production has also fallen by a quarter. Leadership in 
the light and medium weight markets has been lost to an American firm, 
although it ramains the market•leader in the heavier end of the market. 
Yet as two American firms are in the process of completing plants in 
Britain to produce these heavier vehicles, there is every likelihood that 
this dominant position will also be eroded. One of the main reasons for 
this loss of market share has been the reluctance of this firm to buy in 
components developed by supplying firms. Although it has purchased some 
inputs (notably American diesel engines in export models), it has been 
slow to incorporate the ne»i inputs produced by the component industry 
(such as the new axles, engines and gearboxes introduced by these firms 
in the early 1970's). This has not only meant that they have lost the 
benefit of new, improved inputs, but also that they have been unable to 
offer the wide range of choice which their counterparts have done. 
T>ie one sign thit this firm does have some innovative capability has 
been that it has pioneered the introduction of mass-production techniques 
in the manufacture of busses, having set-up a new jointly-owned (with a 
state corporation) plant a few years ago. This is apparr&ntly, the first time 
that /assembly-line has been u .ed in the manufacture of busses, and since earl;? 
I 
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difficulties have "been overcome'•' (Tri"'""pr oduct quil ity, not a bly) t he plant is 
running adequately at full-capacity. But it ..has. shpwfrthe perennial weakness 
of this firm in that scale is not Large enough to meet demand and this has 
allowed competitors to 'rObtain- a- significant share of the home and export 
5 1 " i ' markets. < .».;•,.'• •; : 
For obvious reasons this firm has baen relatively strong in under-
developed countries, particulary. former British colonies. But here, toc^  
the failings in product design mentioned above have led to the erosion 
of the firm's market dominance, notably in the larger Australian and South 
African markets. 
The effect of Global Operations on the Generation and Acquisition 
of Technology by the Kenyan Subsidiary. 
The Kenyan subsidiary of this firm assembles commercial vehicles 
(medium and heavy), busses (the bodywork islooally made) and fourwheel 
drive vehicles from knocked down kits. /ilmost all of the inputs are 
imported, the local content being restricted to batteries, tyres, filters 
etc. The scale of tbe operation .is small even by Europeans standards 
(under 3,000 a year) which/Leaves little opportunity for local manufacture. 
The subsidiary dominates the market for heavy vehicles, busses and 
fourwheel .drive vehicles. Yet is the familiar story of lessening 
dominance over the years as rivals begin to penetrate the Kenyan market. 
The interest of the parent in the Kenyan subsidiary is as a market for 
knocked-down kits. It recognises the Governments wish to encourage 
increased local, .content and is in the process of constructing a newer, 
larger plant (about 4,000 Units per year) in association with the Govern-
ment and ta .local marketing firm. ' Two other assembly plants are being 
built in Kenya so this new development is as much of a 'defensive' action 
as an. 'aggressive' attempt to increase market share. 
Alt'ao.ugh scale will be greater in the new .plant } local content will 
still be minimal. It is difficult therefore to talk about technical change 
in the case of this subsidiary. The production technology in the new 
plant will be slightly different with the introduction of a mini-assembly 
line and spot welding. The .design of this line and the spot welding 
equipment was done by the British parent and most.of the new equipment 
required (bar a few simple- jigs) will be imported. The subsidiary had no 
involvement at all'ln this process. Product technology also follows the 
pattern qf the-parent- some changes (e.g.in spring specifications) have 
been made for the Kenyan market, but these are standard for exports to 
underdeveloped countries and are automatically included in the knocked 
down kits. Material technology is the one sphere where the subsidiary 
has had any involvement, and this has been confined to pursuading local 
manufacturers to produce products (eg soft-trim) in line with the 
government's wish to increase local content. 
In summary, the operations of this subsidiary reflect the unde.ve-
lop..ent of the industrial sector in Kenya and the small size of the 
local market. This necessitates that vehicles have to be assembled 
almost entirely from imported knocked-down kits and leaves little scope 
for locally generated technical change. The structure of global competi-
tion has seen the increased penetration of the Kenyan market by rivals 
and this has to some extent affected the subsidiary by forcing it to 
build a new, larger plant and in pursuading local manufacturers to supply 
components. There is little evidence that this has led to technical change 
in component suppliers (for example, locally made batteries are assembled 
from imported cells and casings). 
r 
Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineering and Design. 
The industry which is the subject of study is that of air 
conditioning and refrigeration design and engineering. It caters prima-
rily for industrial users rather than for final consumption and its 
production is concentrated in larger industrial units, rather than 
mass-produced house-hold refrigeration and air-conditioning units. 
The producing market for these products have become increasingly 
concentrated over the years particularly with regard to the larger 
compressors. The largest single market is that of the USA where most of 
the large firms are situated^The European market is smaller than that 
of the USA and, as with other se&tors, has shown a tendency towards 
increased concentration over the years. The number of producers in 
Europe has halved to about 7 over the last decade and there is every 
expectation that it will shrink even further over the next few years. 
After many years of relatively stable technology, the industry 
seems to have begun a period of rapid change. For example in the sphere of 
production technology, new numerically-controlled machine tools have 
been introduced. They are much more capital intensive than previous 
equipment, with high acquisition costs (in the order of £0.5m) and much 
increased productivity - the one introduced by the firm in this study 
produces a 200hp compressor every 4 hours, while the previous process 
took 4 days. Product technology too has entered a period of rapid change, 
notably the switch from recciprocating to screw compressors. The latter 
have not yet been fully developed but the main advantages should be better 
reliability and greater flexibility. 
It is partly as a result of these changes, requiring fairly large 
research and development inputs and large investment, that the number of 
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producers in the industry has begun to contract. Another feature whihh 
is allied to this changing technology is the extensive use of cross-
licensing practised in the industry - it is estimated that every compre-
ssor produced in the world is produced under -licences held by no more than 
ten firms. 
What distinguishes this fnom other sectors is that most of the large 
producers of equipment also are design contractors, taking on specific 
projects of design and specifying (and perhaps producing) the equipment 
which is installed.' The balance between design and production varies 
between different firms - in the case of the British firm in this sample 
the balance is split evenly between the two activities. 
International cross-penetration of exports of equipment seems to be 
more fully developed than with regard to design. The former is very 
competitive, particularly in Europe where the rationalisation.of 
production has not yet been "completed. "The'American market has begun to 
'open up' to foreign -firms -part iculjrly in low-temperature refrigeration 
equipment. 
The Position of the S-ample Firm in the Global Market. 
In 1974 sales external to the group were £45'36m. There are eleven 
subsidiaries in the group of which two are in underdeveloped countries 
(one in Brazil and one in Kenya')'! The division of international sales 
is s'hovra in table 6". 
Table 6 
External Sales in 1974 
£'000 -
UK 23,294 51.4 
Africa.. . . . . . 10,059 22.2 
Australia 4,973 11 
Europe 3,852 3.5. 
Other 3,180 7 
Source: Company Report. 
The firm1 has emerged -from the merger of three British companies operating 
in this industry and is currently one of 'the thr^e largest' producers in 
Europe. They manufacture for sale to other subsidiaries, to rivals and 
for inclusion into systems which they have designed. 
Although the firm is one of the leading innovators in the industry, 
both in terms of production and product technology, this has depended to 
a large extent on the licences which it has acquired. For example the 
ne.-rly installed numerically-controlled machine tool is an adaptation of 
a "European machine designed originally for another industry, while the 
screw'compressor i"s produced under a French licence. This licence 
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specifies sales to Britain and 'British Trading Partners', while export, 
to other countries is prohibited unless the compressor is part of a., 
larger system designed and produced by the firm. Most large compressors 
produced by Westinghouse in the USA are under licences to this firm. 
The Effect of Global Operations on the Generation and Acquisition 
of Technology by the Kenyan Subsidiary. 
There is little indication that the structure of the global market 
affects the operations of the Kenyan subsidiary in any way. This is for 
a number of reasons. The first is that, as with the parent, the Kenyan 
subsidiary is not only a manufacturing concern. It is largely involved 
in the design and installation of systems which may or may not include the 
parent's products. In fact only about 20% of inputs are purchased from 
the parent which reflects tie fact that the subsidiary is more involved 
with air-conditioning than refrigeration systems (the parent's strong 
point) 
The second reason is that as an industry, design and engineering 
seems to be tied more to local conditions than most industries in under-
developed countries. The main input of the firm is that of skilled 
design staff, and as an input this is little affected by considerations 
of global competition. Another feature of this industry is that there 
are compelling reasons for situating desi -n activities within the country 
of operation rather than in the parent country, particulary as there are 
relatively few fixed costs to this design activity (such as expensive 
plant and equipment) 
The third reason for the relative absence of international pressures 
on this firm is explicable in terms of the historical factors which led 
to its presence in Kenya. Originally (pre independence) the parent 
exported its products to a European owned trading firm. As the volume of 
business grew this trading firm wished to withdraw from the agency to 
concentrate on other interests and the parent therefore took over the 
operation and formed a wholly-owned subsidiary to supply refrigeration 
and air conditioning equipment. Over the years this has grown into a 
design capacity as well, which is largely autonomous from the parent. 
The absence of government measures regulating remittances from the 
subsidiary is probably another contributory factor to the subsidiary's 
apparrent autonomy. 
The subsidiary was asked its views as to whether it was likely that 
some of its competitors may invest in Kenya, and if so what would its 
reaction be to this extension of international competition. The answer 
was that there were corporate problems which arose from its dominance of 
the Kenyan market (there are two other smaller firms in operation) 
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.-concerning -fluctuations in sales and. earnings. Given that the firm holds 
a large share of the market in Kenya, fluctuations in this share inevitably 
led to fluctuations in the firm's turnover. To the extent that there are 
fixed costs in its operation, this has significant implications for 
profitability. Therefore the subsidiary felt.' that new'.entrant's into a 
growing market would be a we.lcope i.nsofer as this would give' some opportu-
nity to even out these fluctuations. 
In summary, the Kenyan subsidiary operates with a considerable 
degree of autonomy from the parent, and is- virtually isolated- from the 
implications of changes in. the global, market. In all probability this 
isolation and autonomy is general to engineering and design firms in 
peripheral economies such as ;<Cenya. 
Conclusions. 
We have concerned ourselves in this paper with the effect of 
global operations on the generation and acquisition of new technology 
by subsidiaries of six multinational firms operating in Kenya. An earlier 
study had established that little new technology had been.gererated by 
these subsidiaries or by other firms operating in Kenya. It is difficult 
to generalise conclusions from the limited sample of case studies. 
There are signs that global competition in. the pharmeceutical industry 
is particularly intense and that this had an.affect on Kenyan operations. 
In addition the 'follower' firm in this oligopolistic market showed a 
greater tendency to adapt to local conditions and this may well be a 
characteristic of oligopolistic markets in general. The greater adaptative 
propensity of the subsidiary in question may also be related to the fact 
that, relatively speaking, it was less vertically integrated than its 
rival and consequently there were fewer corporate pressures to use parent 
production technology. 
The effect of government policies on the behaviour'of subsidiaries 
is drawn out in the case of the. tea subsidiary. : Hero the relative absence 
of government pressure in Kenya, contrasted with its strong presence in 
Asia, has clearly affected the, propensity of the parent to generate some 
of its new technology in Kenya. The behaviour of the vehicle assembling 
subsidiary is another case where government pressure, (or anticipated 
pressure) has forced some (albeit limited) change in technology on the 
Kenyan subsidiary. In this case it is the prospect of anticipated govern-
ment policy, in an internationally competitive sector where penetration 
of market share' by rivals is a great threat, that has affected the 
subsidiary's behaviour. 
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The need to control the behaviour of a rival in relation to a 
lucrative export market characterises the behaviour of the cement firm. 
It provides key techonol6gical inputs to the subsidiary in question and has 
used this to control the acquisitior of new technology by the subsidiary 
which may erode an established export market. .-/A' second feature of great 
interest comes out in the behaviour of the cement firm. The tendency 
towards enforced divestment, particularly in underdeveloped economies, 
has forced the firm to move increasingly out of control through equity to 
control through management contracts. It is perhaps suggestive of a trend 
in the operations of many multinationals in future years. 
Only one subsidiary showed an almost complete absence of response to 
global competitive pressures and this was the engineering design subsid-' 
iary. Possibly this is a feature of capital goods firms in general for 
two reasons. Firstly to internationalisation of capital goods industries 
is a fairly recent phenomenon),and while competitive pressures are beginn-
ing to be felt in production of machinery and equipment, they are largely 
absent in the engineering design sector, This sector is however becoming 
increasingly subject to pressures of global competition and the global 
rationalisation of production is occurring at a rapid pace. It may well 
be therefore that in years to corne the Kenyan subsidiaries in this sector 
too will be subject to global pressures. 
The second reason is that it may be that by their nature capital 
goods industries are forced to adapt to local conditions, since they 
apply scientific and technological principles to meet the requirements of 
specific locally-based customers. This, couple with the relative absence 
of large fixed inputs of machinery and equipment, makes it more likely 
that subsidiaries in this sector will show a greater tendency to generate 
14 their own technology to suit local conditions. 
Care should however be taken in interpreting the case studies in this 
research. In the first place the sample is limited to six firms, which 
may lead to various biass. The most import mt of these is that all of 
the subsidiaries are rather atypical in Kenya in that they operate at 
high rates of capacity utilisation. Subsidiaries with high rates of excess 
capacity may show a different tendency with regard to their generation 
and acquisition of new technology. 
The second cautionary point is that the research has of necessity 
been static in nature. It is not entirely clear how the picture will have 
changed over time, although at least three potential effects may be noted. 
The first is that as scale increases the tendency of the subsidiaries to 
adapt to local conditions (as in the case of one of the pharmeceutical 
subsidiaries) may decrease as parent technology becomes more suited to 
the needs of the subsidiary. This 'negative scale' affect' may be count-
ered by a 'positive scale affect" that as scale increases there may be 
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economies in adapting techniques to meet local factor proportions, market 
tastes and material input availability. The third potential affect is 
that if anything the global pressures will increase as the rivalry of 
international capitals increases. This effect is particularly noticeable 
in the capital goods subsidiaries where the international market is 
becoming increasingly competitive and the interpenetration of markets 
increases. 
Footnotes 
1. Technical Change and the Multinational Corporation; Some British 
Subsidiaries in Kenya, OECD Development Centre, mimeo, 1975» 
} 
2. The stuay mentioned in footnote 1 also looked at the production of tea 
machinery. It has not been possible to obtain an adequate overview of the 
global operations of tea-machinery producers to include the firm in this 
paper. 
3. For an elaboration of the struggle between small and large growers in 
Kenya, see A History of Foreign Investment in Kenya, N. Swanson, in 
Readings on the Multinational Corporation in Kenya, R Kaplinsky (ed), 
forthcoming. 
4. S Lall, The International Pharmeceutical Industry and less Developed 
Bountries, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics Vol 36, No 5 1974* 
5. There are a number of factors which explain this concentration on develop-
ment, rather than basic research. The discovery of a new drug (as opposed 
to a new formulation of an existing drug) can be an expensive business. 
In addition to these basic research expenses the necessary clinical trials 
can take a number of years before the drug can be profitably marketed. 
Given the high discount rate of these pharmeceutical firms the l.gic of 
firm strategy is to concentrate on quick yielding research, notably the 
characteristic of producing new permutations of existing drugs. There 
are also reckoned to be high minimum levels of expenditure in basic R & D. 
One indication of these factors has been that the fairly large Australian 
firm, Aspro-Nicholas, has closed down its Basic research laboratory in 
the UK (with an annual expenditure of about £10m) because of the poor 
return to this sort of research. 
6. Unit Variable costs of the wet process are still lower than total (ie 
fixed plus variable) costs of dry process plants, so there is little 
evidence of scrapping of wet process plants. 
7. All quotes in this paragraph from Company Reports. 
8. The expansion of the coastal plant was explained in an advertisement 
placed by the Nairobi-based firm in the East African Standard in May 1975-
The advertisement is interesting in that it addresses .itelf to the £ 
problem of the non-availability of cement in Kenya by considering the 
strategy of both firms as if they were direct subsidiaries of the same 
parent. In fact, as we have seen, this is not the case, but it does 
portray the strategic control exercised by the parent-firms, although they 
have only a small minority stake in the Nairobi plant. 
9- S. Langdon, personal Communication 
10. One estimate of its importance was that in the 1960's the motor industry 
accounted for about 1/3 of all value added in the engineering industries 
in Western Europe (The Engineering Industries in N America, Europe and 
Japan, OECD, Paris 1967) 
11. The reason why technical change tends to be greater with bought-in compo-; 
nents is presumably because of the scale economies which are open to 
these component suppliers. For example three of Europe's producers have 
jointly -set-up a seperate engine plant as the costs of tooling and 
design were too great for any one of the producers to bear alone, given 
its limited share of the market. 
12. The reported conclusion of a British Government enquiery into the motor 
industry was that by the year 2,000 the world motor industry would be 
dominated by production from E Europe and the semi-developed countries. 
Sunday Telegraph 2/ll/75. 
13. The largest single firm in the industry, however, is in Japan. It has a 
particularly large export market, concentrated in Asia. 

The study in subsidiaries in Kenya (see footnotes 1 and 2) covered 
another Capital goods firm manufacturing tea machinery. The adapta 
bility of this subsidiary and its autonomy seem to support the 
observations with regard to the engineering design firm and the 
Capital goods sector in global. 
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